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ABSTRACT 
 The passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Online Copyright 
Infringement Limited Liability Act engendered a monumental shift in the way copyright law 
is applied by copyright holders.  Where once copyright law was intended as a shield to 
protect against infringing uses, the unilateral reporting and removal provisions contained 
within these statutes have incentivized copyright holders to use the law as a sword, flagging 
potentially infringing uses for removal first and asking questions about fair use later.  The 
ability of copyright holders to obtain the removal of online content with little or not review 
from the online service providers, including YouTube, has even inspired some who have no 
copyright interest in a given piece of content to boldly issue takedown notices without 
consideration for what the law says. Cindy Lee Garcia, the plaintiff in Garcia v. Google, was 
once such party, claiming a copyright interest in a five-second, overdubbed performance 
found within a hideous anti-Islamic propaganda video that she was tricked into appearing 
in.  The Ninth Circuit’s original decision, granting Garcia her copyright and allowing her the 
ability to have the content taken down, generated an unprecedented negative response from 
the legal community, causing the Ninth Circuit to re-hear the case en banc and reverse its 
original decision.  This paper intends to provide background on the takedown provisions of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, summarize the two Ninth Circuit Garcia opinions, and 
analyze both the reaction to them and their impact on copyright moving forward.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An Overview of Copyright and the DMCA 
 As a threshold concept, something is not copyrightable unless it is a “work of 
authorship” that is “fixed in a tangible means of expression.” 17 U.S.C. 102(a).  The Ninth 
Circuit has defined “author” as a “person to whom [a] work owes its origin and who 
superintended the whole work.” Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000).  
The statute considers a work “fixed in a tangible means of expression” when, 
Its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the 
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being 
transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being 
made simultaneously with its transmission. 
 
17 U.S.C. 101.  For decades, the fixation requirement was satisfied by publication (in the case 
of written works) or recording (in the case of music, film, or works of spoken word).  The 
ubiquity of the Internet, specifically the rise of video sharing websites such as YouTube, has 
created an entirely new avenue for content creators to fix their works in a tangible means of 
expression. Along with this new freedom, however, has come an entirely new set of 
challenges in the realm of copyright.  The ability of anyone, anywhere to record and upload 
audio/visual content to websites such as YouTube has been both creatively liberating and, 
increasingly, legally frustrating. 
To keep up with the advancement of digital media and the advent of the Internet, 
Congress implemented reforms to United States copyright law in 1998. 1   In addition, 
Congress hoped to better fulfill the United States’ treaty obligations under the World 
                                                        
1 Executive Summary – Digital Millennium Copyright Act, U.S. Copyright Office, (October 15,  
2015). http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_executive.html 
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Intellection Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty of 1996. Id.  112 Stat. 2860, or 
the “Digital Millennium Copyright Act” (DMCA), was the result of this effort, a comprehensive 
series of additions and amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 that has been the subject 
of much debate in the seventeen years since its passage.  In order to help the United States 
better comply with the WIPO treaty, the DMCA enacted safeguards “against circumvention 
of technological protection measures employed by copyright owners to protect their works, 
and against the removal or alteration of copyright management information.” Id.  In drafting 
the DMCA, Congress also made the determination, 
To promote electronic commerce and the distribution of digital works 
by providing copyright owners with legal tools to prevent widespread 
piracy was tempered with concern for maintaining the integrity of the 
statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners. 
 
Id.  This Congressional determination was made law through the Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), a portion of the DMCA encoded at 17 U.S.C. 
512, that was passed in order to provide “a safe harbor to online service providers (OSPs, 
including internet service providers) that promptly take down content if someone alleges it 
infringes their copyrights.”2  Under OCILLA, copyright holders may approach OSPs and notify 
them of any improper use of the copyright holders’ intellectual property (IP) being hosted 
by the OSPs’ service. Id.  Once notified, the OSP then removes or blocks access to the allegedly 
infringing content and, in exchange, receives a number of legal benefits.  The benefits to OSPs 
include:  
Protection from liability to [their] customers as a result of a decision to remove 
[infringing] material . . . Clear procedures for removing [infringing material] 
and restoring material [eventually found to be non-infringing] . . . [and] a safe 
                                                        
2 Online Copyright Infringement Limited Liability Act (OCILLA), The Anti-Abuse Project, 
(October 15, 2015). http://www.anti-abuse.org/online-copyright-infringement-liability-
limitation-act-ocilla/. 
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harbor against copyright infringement claims, similar to the protection against 
non-intellectual property infringement liability provided by Section 230 the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). 
 
Id.  The exchange was intended to provide immunity from liability to innocent OSPs whose 
services are used by copyright infringers to host infringing content. 
 Notice under OCILLA has a number of requirements before it is deemed adequate 
under the statute. In order to effectively put an OSP on notice, a written communication must 
be delivered to one of the OSP’s designated agents that meets a number of criteria. 17 U.S.C. 
512(c)(3)(A). First, the owner of the allegedly infringed content must sign the 
communication. Id.  Second, the copyrighted work or works allegedly infringed on the given 
website must be identified. Id.  Third, the allegedly infringing content must be identified, 
along with “information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the 
material.” Id. Fourth, the notice must provide contact information for the complaining party. 
Id.  Fifth, the notice must contain “a statement that the complaining party has a good faith 
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright 
owner, its agent, or the law.” Id.  Finally, there must be a statement that the information 
contained in the notice is accurate and, “under penalty of perjury,” that the party issuing the 
complaint is permitted to act on behalf of the allegedly infringed content’s owner. Id.   
Once a valid notification has been received, the OSP may take down the allegedly 
infringing content and thus be immune from liability for, 
Monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other 
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled 
or operated by or for the service provider. 
 
Id.  In order to fully qualify for the safe harbor, the OSP must also, upon obtaining notice, act 
“expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” Id. 
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One of the possible remedies provided to copyright owners under OCILLA is that of 
an injunction. Id.  OCILLA injunctions are subject to a number of limitations. Id at (j).  An 
injunction may be granted under OCILLA with respect to an OSP only in one of three possible 
forms: 
(i) An order restraining the service provider from providing access to 
infringing material or activity residing at a particular online site on the 
provider’s system or network[;] (ii) An order restraining the service provider 
from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service 
provider’s system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is 
identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or 
account holder that are specified in the order[; or,] (iii) Such other injunctive 
relief as the court may consider necessary to prevent or restrain infringement 
of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at a particular online 
location, if such relief is the least burdensome to the service provider among 
the forms of relief comparably effective for that purpose. 
 
Id.  In addition, injunctions may be granted only if they pass the four-part test for injunctive 
relief contained in the statute. Id at (k).  These considerations include: the burden on the 
OSP; the magnitude of the harm to the copyright holder in the absence of an injunction; the 
feasibility, effectiveness, and ability to not interfere with non-infringing material of an 
injunction; and whether any less-burdensome means than an injunction exist to remedy the 
infringement. Id. 
OCILLA has caused the most tension as copyright law has been applied to the evolving 
media landscape of the Internet in the present day. Nowhere has this tension been more 
readily apparent, however, than on YouTube, where the power of having a voice and a 
platform from which to express it has spawned a new breed of entertainers, among whom 
are otherwise regular people who may not be entirely well-versed in copyright law.  This 
lack of sophistication on the part of newly-created authors on the internet has led to a system 
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in which copyright owners have a great deal of power and the OSPs have little incentive to 
resist their influence. 
The Intersection of Copyright/OCILLA and YouTube 
  OCILLA’s notice and removal provisions have sparked the creation of what YouTube 
has called its “ContentID” system.3  “ContentID” is a system by which YouTube flags videos 
uploaded by users that may contain material that is copyrighted by someone else. Id.  Every 
video uploaded to YouTube gets scanned against a database of files submitted to YouTube 
by copyright holders. 4   Once a video has been flagged by the system as containing 
copyrighted material, YouTube sends notice to the owner of the copyright. Id.  YouTube then 
sends a notice to the creator of the video in question informing him or her that there may be 
copyrighted material in the video and that the copyright holder may take further action. Id.  
The copyright owner can choose to monetize the flagged video by running ads on it, track 
the video’s viewership statistics, mute any audio that contains copyright material, or even 
block the video from being viewed in specific locations or worldwide. Id. 
 When the copyright holder chooses to block access to a video containing copyrighted 
material, the creator of the video receives a “copyright strike.”5  YouTube applies a copyright 
strike to the creator of a video when that the owner of a valid copyright has sent YouTube a 
legal request, in accordance with 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A), providing notice of infringing 
content in the video being hosted on the site. Id.  Once the formal notice has been received, 
                                                        
3 YouTube, What Is A ContentID Claim?, YouTube Help (2015). 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6013276.  
4 YouTube, How ContentID Works, YouTube Help (2015), 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370  
5 YouTube, Copyright Strike Basics, YouTube Help (2015). 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000. 
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YouTube has almost no choice but to remove the content; failure to do so would result in the 
removal of the safeguards provided by OCILLA to OSPs. Id.  The creators of allegedly 
infringing content have only three option when it comes to resolving copyright strikes, which 
include: completing a YouTube-designed course in copyright, and receiving no additional 
strikes for six months; contacting the copyright holder and requesting a retraction of their 
copyright claim; or submitting a counter-notification that the video was either misidentified 
as infringing or qualifies for fair use protections. Id. 
 “Fair Use” is the concept that allows the copyrighted content to be used without the 
permission of the copyright holder provided that the content meets a four-part test.6  The 
first consideration is the “purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” Id.  For the first factor, courts 
typically consider whether the new work is “transformative” by adding new expression or 
meaning to the original work. Id.  Commercial use of copyrighted material goes against a 
finding of fair use, although it is possible to monetize an allegedly infringing use and still 
receive fair use protections. Id.  The second consideration is the nature of the copyright work 
being drawn from; if the copyright work is one of fiction, for example, it may be harder to 
receive fair use protections than if the copyright work were one of fact. Id.  The third 
consideration is the amount of the copyrighted work used in the allegedly infringing work, 
with a finding of fair use being less likely the more of the original work has been used. Id.  
The final consideration is the effect of the allegedly infringing use on the market for the 
                                                        
6 YouTube, What is Fair Use?, YouTube Copyright Center (October 15, 2015). 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/fair-use.html#yt-copyright-four-factors. 
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original work. Id.  If the new work, for example, takes profits away from the original work, 
fair use is less likely to apply. Id. 
 Most of the controversy regarding ContentID has sprung from the potential for abuse 
by copyright holders present in a system where works of expression may be suppressed or 
removed unilaterally without a process for appeal in place until after the suppression or 
removal occurs.7  One context where this issue has come up quite frequently, for example, 
has been the realm of video game media; users on YouTube who create videos of themselves 
playing video games and providing commentary (referred to as “Let’s Play videos”) have 
become targets of the companies that own the video game IP. Id.  While some video game 
companies have expressed support for the YouTube community and disappointment with 
YouTube’s system, the ContentID program has been abused by other companies both as a 
way to prevent monetization of this fair use content and as a way of silencing harsh critics of 
bad games. Id. 
 Criticism and commentary has become an essential part of the world’s economy 
where entertainment is concerned.  Consumers of entertainment media in all of its forms 
(books, video games, television, music, film, etc.) can latch on to their favorite reviewers and 
consult their reviews before purchasing a product. The ContentID system as it currently 
stands allows the owners of IP to get videos removed from YouTube without filing for an 
injunction just by sending a formal communication to YouTube claiming that their IP is being 
infringed on. Id.  The chilling effect such a system could have on free speech is obvious.  As 
                                                        
7 Eric Kain, YouTube Responds to ContentID Crackdown, Plot Thickens, Forbes (December 17, 
2013). http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2013/12/17/youtube-responds-to-
content-id-crackdown-plot-thickens/. 
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mentioned above, the system even allows IP owners to divert monetization away from the 
YouTube user who created the video, having the money sent to the IP owner instead. Id. 
 YouTube’s implementation of the ContentID system has almost no basis in the actual 
copyright law itself. Id. The main reason why the system is in place is because YouTube 
receives a cut of the money made from advertisement attached to every monetized video 
hosted on the service. Id.  If the owner of a copyright issues a formal takedown notice under 
the DMCA, then YouTube has to remove the video entirely and, as a result, take no cut of the 
money it makes. Id. By allowing the copyright holder to instead submit a claim under 
ContentID, the video can stay up only with the money going to YouTube and the copyright 
holder rather than the people who actually made the video in question. Id. 
 While these issues with ContentID and DMCA takedown notices would seem to have 
little to do with an anti-Islam propaganda film, and the people who were tricked into 
appearing in it, the problems of ContentID claims and DMCA/OCILLA takedowns are an ever-
present concern to free speech on the internet, specifically on YouTube. A new front in the 
battle for free Internet speech opened up three years ago, when a man named Mark Basseley 
Youssef decided to create one of the most offensive short films of all time with the help of a 
group of unwitting actors and crew.  One member of the film’s cast, Cindy Lee Garcia, 
attempted to send a takedown notice to YouTube based on her supposed copyright interest 
in her performance.  The resulting Ninth Circuit appellate case became almost as infamous 
as the video itself, at least in the realm of copyright law.  
II.  Garcia v. Google 1 
Factual Background/Procedural History 
 14 
 Mark Basseley Youssef (also known as “Nakoula Basseley Nakoula” and “Sam Bacile”) 
sent out a casting call for what he claimed to be a period action film set in the Middle East 
called “Desert Warrior”. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 2014).  One of the 
actors who answered the call was Cindy Lee Garcia. Id.  Garcia signed up to be paid $500 for 
three and a half days of shooting; she was to appear in a very minor role, receiving only four 
script pages on which she had any dialogue in the entire film.  Id.  Rather than actually finish 
the “Desert Warrior” film, Youssef took the footage he shot with Garcia and the other actors 
and dubbed over their voices with new dialogue that consisted almost entirely of anti-Islamic 
language. Id. In one of her brief scenes, for example, Garcia’s character appeared to be asking 
someone, “Is your Muhammad a child molester?” Id. 
 Once the actual film, re-titled as “Innocence of Muslims,” began making its way around 
the world, it eventually reached Egypt. Id at 1262. The film’s anti-Islam sentiments led to 
riots; an Egyptian Muslim cleric even called for the deaths of all who were involved in the 
making of the film. Id. Ms. Garcia began receiving personal death threats shortly thereafter. 
Id.  In response to the death threats, Garcia began asking Google, the owners of YouTube, to 
take the video down. Id.  Garcia sent in eight DMCA takedown notices to Google, all of which 
were met with resistance. Id.  When Garcia provided substantive explanations for why the 
video should have been taken down, Google still resisted. Id. In response, Garcia filed for a 
temporary restraining order, claiming that Google’s hosting of the video on YouTube 
infringed her copyright in her performance in the film. Id. 
 The district court in California treated the case as one for a preliminary injunction. Id.  
In denying Garcia’s application, the district court reasoned that, 
Garcia had delayed in bringing the action, had failed to demonstrate "that the 
requested preliminary relief would prevent any alleged harm" and was 
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unlikely to succeed on the merits because she'd granted Youssef an implied 
license to use her performance in the film. 
 
Id.  In response to her failure in the district court, Garcia appealed the decision to the Ninth 
Circuit. Id. 
Majority Opinion 
 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the denial of Garcia’s preliminary injunction under a four-
factor test. Id.  The factors are: “a plaintiff's likely success on the merits, the likelihood that 
irreparable harm will result if an injunction doesn't issue, the balance of equities and the 
public interest.” Id. (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).  The 
district court found against Garcia on the first two of these factors and, as a result, did not 
consider the second two. Id.  Stated plainly, the main issue for Garcia is that she had to prove 
“not only that she likely has an independent interest in her performance but that Youssef 
doesn't own any such interest as a work for hire and that he doesn't have an implied license 
to use her performance.” Id. 
 The prevailing opinion on copyright interest in film is that films are joint works, the 
end result of the efforts put in by a number of different people who may all be considered 
“authors” of some portion of the end product.” Id. at 1262-63 (citing Nimmer On Copyright, 
Section 6.05 at 6-14 (1990)).  Garcia argued in front of the Ninth Circuit that she did not 
qualify as a joint author of “Innocence of Muslims” and that she never intended her 
performance to become part of the film as a “joint work.” Id at 1263.  Judge Kozinski, writing 
for the Ninth Circuit majority, reasoned that even in the absence of a joint author situation, 
so long as the individual’s contribution to the film is both fixed and “sufficiently creative,” 
then there could still be a copyright interest in the contribution. Id. 
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 Despite Google’s argument that Youssef wrote all the words Garcia spoke managed 
the entire production, and even eventually replaced all of Garcia’s spoken performance with 
dubbed dialogue, Judge Kozinski appeared convinced of the notion that “an actor does far 
more than speak words on a page; he must ‘live his part inwardly, and then . . . give to his 
experience an external embodiment.’" Id. (citing Constantin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares 
15, 219 (Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood trans., 1936). 
 In breaking from years of copyright law in the realm of film authorship and film 
copyright ownership, Judge Kozinski’s opinion would essentially separate the individual 
contributions made by each actor and crew member to the film, providing them all a 
copyright interest in that contribution. Id. at 1264.  Kozinski’s opinion even twists the 
language of Ninth Circuit copyright precedent into supporting this notion by quoting the 
statement, “"authorship is required under the statutory definition of a joint work, and . . . 
authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution." Id. 
(citing Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232).  The opinion incorrectly analogizes the question of 
film authorship with “the author of a single poem” not necessarily becoming “a co-author of 
the anthology in which the poem is published.” Id. at 1265.  Such an analogy does not apply 
become a poem is still separable from an anthology and can stand on its own, whereas the 
contributions to a film combine to make the film what it is; the whole matters more than the 
sum of its parts. 
 Once satisfied that Garcia’s performance was both fixed and sufficiently creative to 
create a copyright interest, the majority opinion next focused on Google’s “Work For Hire” 
argument. Id.  Under the Work For Hire Doctrine, “the rights to Garcia's performance vested 
in Youssef if Garcia was Youssef's employee and acted in her employment capacity or was an 
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independent contractor who transferred her interests in writing.” Id. (citing Cmty. For 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).  Film productions have presented a 
unique problem when it comes to how one qualifies as an employee; since actors and crew 
members are contracted to work on that single production alone, the lines between 
traditional employment and independent contracting can become blurred. Id. As a way of 
solving this problem, written agreements transferring all authorship rights to the owners of 
the film in question (usually the film studio) are obtained before production begins. Id. Such 
as was not the case with “Innocence of Muslims.” Id.   
 In the absence of a written agreement, the majority opinion rejected the notion that 
Garcia was an employee because Youssef controlled every aspect of the production, 
including the scenes in which Garcia appeared, and because Youssef was in the business of 
making films at the time. Id.  In making this rejection, the majority opinion merely dismissed 
the notion of possible employment by claiming that there was no evidence in the record to 
support the claim that Youssef controlled every aspect of the production or that he was in 
the business of making films. Id. at 1265-66. 
 The majority opinion next considered whether there existed an implied license 
between Garcia and Youssef giving Youssef the right to use Garcia’s performance to make 
“Innocence of Muslims.” Id.  Google argued that Garcia gave Youssef an implied license to use 
her performance and the majority opinion agreed, holding that Garcia gave her performance 
at Youssef’s request and handed it over to him, intending that he copy and distribute it. Id. In 
addition, the majority acknowledged that “without an implied license, the performance for 
which [Garcia] was paid would be unusable.” Id.  Even in spite of the finding that there was 
an implied license, and the additional concession that such licenses must be construed 
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broadly so that an actor cannot derail a film’s release because it did not “meet [the actor’s] 
ex ante expectation,” the majority still found that the use of Garcia’s performance in the 
present case went to far beyond the license. Id.  According to the majority, 
Garcia was told she'd be acting in an adventure film set in ancient Arabia. Were 
she now to complain that the film has a different title, that its historical 
depictions are inaccurate, that her scene is poorly edited or that the quality of 
the film isn't as she'd imagined, she wouldn't have a viable claim that her 
implied license had been exceeded. 
 
Id. at 1266-67.  Not only was “Innocence of Muslims” not an adventure film set in ancient 
Arabia, it wasn’t “intended to entertain at all.” Id. at 1267.  The fact that Youssef had to lie to 
Garcia to obtain her participation, the majority reasoned, was proof that he had exceeded the 
license in making “Innocence of Muslims.” Id. 
 Turning to the irreparable harm argument, the majority broke with the district court 
in its assessment that Garcia’s failure to bring her lawsuit immediately upon learning the 
true nature of the film disproves her need for quick action, the hallmark of any granted 
preliminary injunction. Id.  Instead, the majority cited the nexus between the harm being 
caused (the numerous death threats Garcia was receiving) and the conduct she sought to 
enjoin (the copyright infringement). Id. at 1268.  Since Youssef made “Innocence of Muslims” 
by infringing on Garcia’s supposed copyright in her performance, the majority chose to “err 
on the side of life” and weigh this factor of the preliminary injunction test in Garcia’s favor. 
Id. 
 Finally, the majority considered the balance of the equities and the public interest 
together during the final paragraphs of the opinion. Id.  The balance of the equities was easy 
for the majority to dismiss in Garcia’s favor because Youssef was fraudulent in his purpose 
and because Google did not focus on the balance of the equities in their response. Id.  Instead, 
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Google focused on the public interest in leaving the video on YouTube, claiming that a 
preliminary injunction against the video constitutes “unconstitutional prior restraint of 
speech;” the majority countered by claiming that, because it has found Garcia had a copyright 
interest in the performance, the Constitution does not protect against copyright 
infringement. Id.  
 In the end, the majority opinion in Garcia 1 ultimately ordered the case was to be 
reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 1269. 
Dissent 
 The dissent in Garcia 1, written by Judge Smith, immediately criticized the majority 
opinion be questions its categorization of the injunction as preliminary rather than 
mandatory. Id.  “Rather than asking to maintain the status quo pending litigation, Garcia 
demands Google immediately remove a film from YouTube,” the dissent argued, and as such 
the injunction must be given a high degree of scrutiny considering the Ninth Circuit disfavors 
mandatory injunctions. Id.  In fact, under Ninth Circuit precedent, mandatory injunctions 
should only be issued if the “‘facts and law clearly favor the moving party.’” Id. (citing Stanley 
v. Univ. of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (1994)).  The dissent therefore argued 
that “the majority may only reverse if it were illogical or implausible . . . for the district court 
to conclude that the law and facts did not clearly favor Garcia.” Id. at 1269-1270 (citing United 
States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 Turning to the four Winter Factors, the dissent first discussed Garcia’s copyright 
interest, or lack thereof, in her performance. Id. at 1270.  Rather than categorize the acting 
performance as its own separate and copyrightable work, the dissent instead argued that a 
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performance actually resembles a “procedure” or “process” by which an original work (the 
script) is performed. Id.  The film itself was the “work,” according to the dissent. Id. at 1271. 
 In addition, the dissent questioned Garcia’s authorship over the film. Id.  To 
accomplish this, the dissent compared Garcia’s contributions to “Innocence of Muslims” with 
the contributions of Aalmuhammed to the film Malcolm X in the Aalmuhammed case. Id. The 
court in that case concluded that Aalmuhammed, 
“(1) Did not at any time have superintendence of the work," (2) "was not the 
person 'who . . . actually formed the picture by putting the persons in position, 
and arranging the place," (3) could not "benefit" the work "in the slightest 
unless [the director] chose to accept [his recommendations]," and (4) made 
"valuable contributions to the movie," but that alone was "not enough for co-
authorship of a joint work." 
 
Id. at 1272 (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000)).  Garcia’s 
contributions to “Innocence of Muslims,” in comparison were even less than 
Aalmuhammed’s, who was at least an expert on Malcolm X and Islam and provided creative 
consultation for Malcolm X’s actors. Id.  Garcia conceded that she held no creative control 
over the script (which was provided by Youssef) or her performance (which was directed y 
Youssef). Id.  While a work may have joint authors, those authors must have (1) intended 
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole; 
and (2) exercised meaningful creative control over the work. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 
1234.  As a result of Garcia’s minimal contributions to the final film, the dissent finds it 
illogical that Congress could have intended copyright law to apply in this scenario. Id. at 
1272-73. 
 As to fixation, the dissent pointed to three cases that, when combined, help to 
disprove Garcia’s claim. Id. In the first case, Bette Midler sued Ford for misappropriating her 
voice; Ford had properly licensed one of Midler’s songs for use in a commercial but had hired 
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someone to imitate her voice rather than use the original recording. Id. (citing Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).  Despite ultimately ruling in favor of Ford, the 
Midler court still held that, while Midler’s voice was not copyrightable, the entirety of the 
song was. Id.  In the second case, Sony prevailed in a copyright preemption claim where they 
properly licensed a song for use in a commercial but only used a portion of the actual song; 
because Sony did not hire someone to imitate the original singer’s voice, they won the case. 
Id. (citing Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006)).  In the 
third case, the Defendants illegally copied, reproduced, and counterfeited copyright 
pornographic DVDs before selling sold the copies to third parties; the Ninth Circuit ruled in 
favor of the original producers of the DVDs, holding they had a copyright interest in the DVDs. 
Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146-1153 (9th Cir. 2010).  
“Combined, these cases show that, just as the singing of a song is not copyrightable, while the 
entire song recording is copyrightable, the acting in a movie is not copyrightable, while the 
movie recording is copyrightable.” Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1274.  The comparison of an actor’s 
performance in a film to a singer’s performance in a recorded piece of music is an apt one, as 
a singer and actor are both parts of a larger group of people that come together to create a 
finished product. Id. at 1274-75. 
 Having defeated Garcia’s copyright interest argument, the dissent next turned to the 
Work For Hire Doctrine. Id.  The dissent placed a good deal of weight on the Work For Hire 
Doctrine analysis, mainly because “in the United States most contributions to a motion 
picture are created as works made for hire.” Id. at 1275 (F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee 
Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 
225, 238 (2001)).  According to the undisputed record, 
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Garcia conceded in her complaint and affidavit that Youssef "managed all 
aspects of production," controlling both the manner and means of making the 
film, including the scenes featuring Garcia . . . Youssef provided the 
instrumentalities and tools, dictated the filming location, decided when and 
how long Garcia worked, and was engaged in the business of film making at 
the time. Additionally, Garcia did not hire or pay assistants. 
 
Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1275.  The dissent also distinguished the Garcia facts from those found in 
Reid by explaining that, in Reid, a sculptor was hired to create a sculpture for a non-profit 
organization that only had control over the specifications of the sculpture. Id. at 1275-76 
(citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 752).  The sculptor himself had control over all the other relevant 
factors in the Work for Hire Doctrine analysis and, as a result, the Reid Court ruled in favor 
of the sculptor. Id. at 1276 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 752).  Here, Garcia had no control over any 
aspect of her performance or over the film itself and, thus, was clearly an employee under 
the Work For Hire Doctrine. Therefore, " the employer or other person for whom the work 
was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 Following its Work for Hire discussion, the dissent next discussed the presence of 
irreparable harm. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1276.  The majority held that the district court abused 
its discretion by finding that Garcia’s five-month delay in bringing suit was fatal to her 
irreparable harm argument. Id. The dissent, instead, looked past the threats to Garcia’s life 
and instead separated them from the legal rights that Garcia’s case is supposedly about 
protecting. Id.  “Were Garcia really trying to protect her purported copyright interest in her 
acting performance, one would expect her to have brought this action immediately after 
learning of the alleged infringing behavior.” Id.  The only relevant harm for the irreparable 
harm analysis, according to the dissent, is the one that occurs to the legal interests of the 
parties; framing the issue that way, the dissent held that Garcia “failed to explain her delay 
in terms of harm to her alleged copyright interest.” Id.  Further, an aspect of irreparable harm 
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in Garcia’s situation was whether or not preventing future viewings of the video on YouTube 
would prevent future harm. Id.  As Garcia admitted she had already gone public about her 
condemnation of the video, there was really nothing further she could do since bring the 
video down from YouTube would not prevent the people who had copied it to other sites 
from viewing it. Id. 
 Separating the balance of the equities from the public interest, the dissent first 
discussed how the balancing did not favor Garcia. Id. at 1277.  Even if Garcia did have a 
protectable copyright interest in her performance, the loss of her preliminary injunction 
motion would mean she is “only faced with potential infringement of her potential copyright 
interest pending a final disposition of this lawsuit.” Id.  Further, if Garcia truly valued her 
performance as much as her lawsuit would suggest, the dissent questioned why she did not 
have a contract with Youssef outlining her rights. Id.  “The facts evidence that she acted for 
three days and was paid $500 dollars,” meaning her performance was not worth much effort 
and, thus, neither is any potential copyright interest in it. Id.  In addition, the dissent rejected 
the majority’s discussion of Youssef in the balance of the equities because Youssef was not a 
party to the court proceedings and Google was not a party to any transaction with Youssef. 
Id.  The dissent ultimately weighed the balance of the equities in favor of Google. Id. 
 Concerning the public interest, the dissent believe strongly in the idea that the public 
‘s interest in a strong First Amendment is one of the most important concerns in any legal 
action implicating free speech. Id.  However, the dissent did concede that the First 
Amendment does not protect copyright infringement, although with the caveat that “if 
Google was actually infringing Garcia’s copyright” it would not be protected. Id.  Since Google 
was not infringing any actual copyright owned by Garcia, the public interest in favor of 
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protecting free speech by not taking the video down until after litigation should have won 
out in the end. Id. at 1277-78.  Unfortunately, the majority did not agree and, as a result, a 
fierce backlash to such an unprecedented opinion began building around the country. 
Reaction to the Decision 
 The negative reaction to the Garcia decision was almost immediate. Those who 
criticized the opinion following its issuance could be categorized mainly into at least one of 
three categories: 
Some [argued] that the court erred in so ruling because Garcia’s performance 
[did] not actually satisfy the Copyright Act’s requirements; others [suggested] 
the court’s analysis [was] wrong because it [failed] to properly take into 
account important legislative and constitutional protections of free 
expression; and yet others [contended] the result [was] mistaken because of 
its likely practical effects on certain business models.8 
 
In addition to the common complaints, another concept arose from the Garcia case 
concerning how Garcia was using copyright law to achieve goals for which it was not 
intended. Id.  Garcia “latched on to copyright as a means of removing the film [from YouTube] 
once other options [for preventing people from seeing it] were deemed less than ideal.” Id.   
 Scholars and other members of the legal community were not the only ones coming 
out against the original decision in Garcia.9  Netflix, the giant streaming video service, added 
its voice to the chorus of parties urging the Ninth Circuit to hold a rehearing en banc in the 
Garcia matter. Id.  One apt comparison offered by Netflix was their questioning whether a bit 
                                                        
8 Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives in Garcia v. Google and Beyond, Stanford Law Review, 67 
Stan. L. Rev. Online 37 (August 20, 2014). http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/ex-
post-incentives-and-ip-in-garcia-v-google-and-beyond. 
 
9 Eriq Gardner, Netflix Asks Appellate Court to Reconsider ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Ruling, The 
Hollywood Reporter (April 15, 2014). http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/netflix-asks-appellate-court-reconsider-696226. 
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actor in Gone With The Wind could have enjoined the distribution of that classic film because 
he or she did not appreciate her performance appearing in a “Yankee propaganda” film. Id. 
Netflix has no ability, it argued, “to determine whether licensing niceties have been observed 
for each of the tens of thousands of works it distributes, and no easy way to assess or defend 
against a claim if they have not.” Id. 
 There were some in the immediate aftermath of the first Garcia decision who felt that 
the ruling’s impact would be minimal because contracts can be drawn up and signed that 
remove the kind of interest Garcia attempted to assert in the absence of a contract. Id.  In 
response, however, opponents of the Garcia holding pointed out that if a potential copyright 
claim has “even a hint of legitimacy,” whether or not it is actually valid, “service providers 
will err on the side of caution by removing works in the face of a takedown demand in the 
interest of gaining safe harbor from copyright liability.” Id.  This notion once again returns to 
the consequences of systems such as YouTube’s ContentID; despite YouTube and Google 
fighting for free speech in Garcia, nobody can accurately predict how they would have no 
behaved after having lost that fight. As system such as ContentID is the perfect framework 
for an OSP to easily remove content that may or may not actually be infringing on a copyright. 
Netflix argued, 
By creating a new species of copyright, and empowering essentially any 
performer in a motion picture or television program to both sue downstream 
distributors and enjoin any use of her performance of which she does not 
approve, the panel majority risks wreaking havoc with established copyright 
and business rules on which all third party distributors, including Netflix, 
depend. 
 
Id.  Content distributors such as YouTube and Netflix are simply not equipped to parse 
through each individual claim and, thus, would likely find it easier to acquiesce than fight. 
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The implications of Garcia extended beyond the content providers themselves as well.  
Both NPR and The Washington Post argued that the subjects of unflattering news coverage 
could, in effect, exercise a kind of veto power over broadcast, or public officials could claim 
copyright in their prepared remarks and request video of a poor speaking performance be 
taken down. Id.  Documentary filmmakers, including Supersize Me director Morgan Spurlock, 
also expressed concern about the subjects of their filmed interviews figuring out a way to 
work the Garcia holding in their favor. Id.  All told, the objecting parties included such 
heavyweight corporations as “Facebook, eBay, Gawker, Twitter, Yahoo, 
IAC/InterActiveCorp, Tumblr, [and] Kickstarter” among others. Id. 
III.  Garcia v. Google 2 
Intervening Facts 
The parties urging a rehearing eventually won out and the Ninth Circuit agreed to 
reconsider the Garcia holdng.10 Not all parties with an interest in the case came out against 
the initial Garcia decision, however; one of the main proponents of the ruling was SAG-
AFTRA, the guild of film and television actors. Id.  After the Ninth Circuit announced the 
rehearing, SAG-AFTRA submitted its own amicus brief complete with references to famous 
actors who, according to the guild, did bring originality to their performances. Id.  According 
to SAG-AFTRA, opponents of the original decision have argued that an actor is nothing more 
the “‘a puppet’” that reads lines from a script the way the director tells them to. Id.  In reality, 
the guild argued, actors bring immense originality to their roles, even in roles that have been 
portrayed numerous times by other actors. Id.  Pointing to the character of Batman, the guild 
                                                        
10 Eriq Gardner, Actors Guild Gets Behind Copyrights For Some Performers, The Hollywood 
Reporter (December 8, 2014). http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/actors-guild-
gets-behind-copyrights-754973. 
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argued that each of the actors to have played the character brought something unique to it, 
such that no two portrayals have ever been the same. Id.  In addition, the guild mentioned 
the late Heath Ledger’s performance as the Joker, including how the actor maintained in an 
interview before his death that director Christopher Nolan had given him “free rein” to 
discover the character over the course of a month. Id. 
In any event, even though some copyright scholars, such as the famous David Nimmer, 
argued that there may actually be a copyright interest in an actor’s performance, they still 
felt that Garcia’s particular performance fell well short of whatever mark defines the 
minimum requirements needed to obtain it. Id.   In response, the guild argued that any 
performance, no matter how small, consists of the actor’s original expression and even 
pointed to one of the great brief performances in film history: Robert Duvall’s speech about 
the smell of napalm from Apocalypse Now. Id.  Finally, the guild admitted that most major 
studios are signatories to collective bargaining agreements that expressly limit the rights 
contributors to films may have; while such agreements do not affect independent filmmakers 
such as Youssef, the guild felt that in certain situations it is proper to award copyright 
interests to an actor for his or her performance. Id.  Garcia’s case, according to the guild, was 
one of those instances. Id. 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit set about conducting an en banc rehearing of the 
Garcia decision and the majority came out with quite a different holding the second time 
through. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747 (9th Cir. 2015) (Garcia  2). 
Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions 
 Surprising few, the Ninth Circuit’s rehearing was essentially an excuse to completely 
reverse the holding of the original Garcia opinion. Id. at 747.  Judge McKeown’s opinion 
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essentially echoed the sentiments of Judge Smith’s dissent in the original Garcia decision, 
outlining them once again, point-by-point and in detail. Id. at 733-47.  Without repeating the 
entirety of the preceding section, certain new additions to each argument bear analysis.  
Concerning the copyright claim, Judge McKeown brought up the Copyright Office and how it 
had rejected Garcia’s application to copyright her performance. Id. at  741.  The Office added 
that it continued to support that traditional notion that a film is “a single integrated work” 
and that Garcia’s performance is no severable from that work; absent any contribution to the 
film other than her very brief performance, Garcia has no copyright interest in the film. Id. at 
742.  In addition, to hold that Garcia had a copyright interest in her brief performance could 
also open the doors to film’s with enormous casts of extras (including Ben-Hur or The Lord 
of the Rings) to have to negotiate the copyright interests of each extra prior to filming. Id. at 
742-43.  Such an outcome would not be practical for the film industry. 
 As to irreparable harm, the injuries claimed by Garcia (the threats to her life and her 
fear of those threats) do not have anything to do with her copyright interests; the irreparable 
harm question concerns harm to copyright interests alone, specifically the “value and 
marketability” of the work or works at issue. Id. at 744-45.  In Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 
former professional wrestler Hulk Hogan sought an injunction against a website that had 
posted a sex tape of himself with a mistress online, citing copyright issues. 913 F.Supp.2d 
1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012).  In Bollea, as in Garcia, “the only evidence in the record reflecting 
harm . . . relates to harm . . . personally . . . due to the . . . nature of the Video's content . . . not 
. . . irreparable harm in the context of copyright infringement.” Garcia 2, 786 F.3d at 745 
(citing Bollea, 913 F.Supp.2d at 1329).  Finally, again echoing the lack of urgency in Garcia’s 
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filing as detrimental to her claim for irreparable harm, the opinion held against her. Garcia 
2, 786 F.3d at 746. 
 The opinion after rehearing also included a concurrence from Judge Watford. Id. at 
747.  Interestingly, Judge Watford did not seem to agree that Garcia does not possess a 
copyright interest in her short performance during “Innocence of Muslims.” Id. at 749. In fact, 
the sole reason why Judge Watford concurred in the ultimate judgment was that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, on this record, Garcia failed to satisfy 
the irreparable harm” analysis. Id. Judge Watford had a different take on the reasoning 
behind Garcia’s failure to meet the irreparable harm standard, however, arguing: 
The sad but unfortunate truth is that the threat posed to Garcia by issuance of 
the fatwa will remain whether The Innocence of Muslims is available on 
YouTube or not. Garcia is subject to the fatwa because of her role in making 
the film, not because the film is available on YouTube. The film will 
undoubtedly remain accessible on the Internet for all who wish to see it even 
if YouTube no longer hosts it. Bottom line: Garcia's requested injunction won't 
change anything about the content of the film or the part, however limited, she 
played in its making. 
 
Id. at 748.  Even though Garcia’s actual role in the making of the film was misunderstood by 
many in the Islamic community, and even though Garcia had taken several steps to ensure 
that her true feelings on Islam were know to the world, the threats to her life did not cease. 
Id.  As a result, enjoining the video from appearing n YouTube would not result in a remedy 
to the harm Garcia had been facing and, thus, she failed the irreparable harm analysis. Id. 
 Judge Kozinski, likely defending his radical position in the original Garcia opinion so 
as not to appear completely wrong, wrote the dissent in Garcia 2. Id. at 749.  The crux of Judge 
Kozinski’s argument was that the alleged harms that would be suffered by film studios were 
overstated, as were the potential harm to those internet companies that host the content 
online. Id. at 749-53.  Judge Kozinski appeared to be advocating for the separability of every 
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scene in every film ever made, an outcome that would cause untold havoc in the world of 
film. Id. at 750 (“If Garcia's scene is not a work, then every take of every scene of, say, Lord of 
the Rings is not a work, and thus not protected by copyright, unless and until the clips become 
part of the final movie”).  
 In addition, the dissent tried to draw a distinction between “joint authorship of a 
movie” and “whether a contribution to a movie can be a ‘work.’” Id.  The dissent hoped to 
categorize every individual contribution to a film as its own copyrightable “work” that would 
allow its creator to exercise some control over the contribution. Id.  According to the dissent, 
the fact that Garcia did not sign away her copyright interests to Youssef before recording the 
film meant that she obtained rights to her performance the moment it was fixed on film. Id. 
at 751.  Such am interpretation of the facts neglects to consider the fact that such an 
assignation of rights does not need to be obtained in writing to occur, something the dissent 
even uses in support of its own contentions later in the opinion. Id. at 751-52. (“The harm 
the majority fears would result from recognizing performers' copyright claims in their fixed, 
original expression is overstated. The vast majority of copyright claims by performers in 
their contributions are defeated by a contract and the work for hire doctrine . . . And most of 
the performers that fall through the cracks would be found to have given an implied license 
to the film's producers to use the contribution in the ultimate film.”). 
 It appears clear that both the majority in Garcia 1 and the dissent in Garcia 2 saw a 
person in need of some assistance, any assistance that could be given, and wanted to aid her.  
Such a proposition, while noble, does not take into account the numerous consequences of 
action focused in the realm of copyright law.  The new majority opinion remedied a fracture 
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in the foundation of copyright in film and on the internet that could have led to a collapse of 
epic proportions. 
Reception to the Rehearing 
 As opposed to Garcia 1’s reception, the reception to Garcia 2 has been largely one of 
relief and positivity. 11   As the vast majority of Garcia 1’s critics felt that the decision 
constituted a prior restraint of free speech on the internet, it is not difficult to understand 
why the reaction to Garcia 2 was so largely positive. Id.  Despite the controversial views and 
language contained within Youssef’s film, views and language that is quite repugnant in 
truth, most observers felt that the remedies of copyright law should not be used to censor 
the film from YouTube.12  
 Not all of those who supported the ultimate ruling by the Ninth Circuit on rehearing 
had praise for the court itself, however; many were quick to voice their frustration that the 
rehearing decision took over a year after the original opinion’s publication to come out. Id.  
As the opinion in Garcia 1 was harmful to the First Amendment, critics of the Ninth Circuit 
felt that they had abandoned the right to unrestrained free speech for over year while they 
waited to correct their mistake. Id.  In the end, however, it appeared as though only Judge 
Kozinski himself was left defending the Garcia 1 opinion, while proponents of free speech on 
the internet breathed a sigh of relief. Id.  Even though the opinion following the rehearing 
was only issued in May of 2015, the better law of the Garcia 2 opinion has already had the 
                                                        
11 Corynne McSherry, Finally! Victory for Free Speech in Garcia v. Google, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (May 18, 2015). https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/finally-victory-free-
speech-garcia-v-google. 
12 Michael Loney, Garcia v. Google Reversal Warmly Received (Except by Judge Kozinski), 
Managing Intellectual Property - The Global IP Resource (May 20, 2015). 
http://www.managingip.com/Blog/3455424/Garcia-v-Google-reversal-warmly-received-
except-by-Judge-Kozinski.html.  
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opportunity to affect another Federal Circuit and its jurisprudence. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. 
Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2nd Cir. 2015). 
IV.  Subsequent Jurisprudence and Analysis 
 In 16 Casa Duse, a film production company in New York (“Casa Duse”) purchased the 
rights to a screenplay called Heads Up with the intention of making it into a short film. Casa 
Duse, 791 F.3d at 251.  Krakovski, the owner of Casa Duse, approached Merkin to direct the 
film; Merkin agreed and the two settled on a fee of $1,500 for Merkin’s services. Id.  Krakovski 
proceeded to hire a cast and crew for the film, with all the hiring subject to Krakovski final 
say despite some minor input from Merkin. Id.  Each cast and crew member other than 
Merkin entered into a “work-for-hire” agreement with Casa Duse that assigned all copyright 
interest in the film to Casa Duse. Id.  Krakovski sent a copy of a similar agreement, called the 
“Director Employment Agreement,” to Merkin, who acknowledge receipt and added that he 
needed further time for review. Id.  Merkin never executed the agreement and production 
began anyway, with Merkin performing his duties as director over the course of a three-day 
shoot. Id.  When production concluded, Krakovski gave a hard drive containing the raw 
footage from the shoot to Merkin in the hopes that Merkin would edit the footage. Id.  To 
effectuate this purpose, the parties entered into a “Media Agreement,” “under which Merkin 
would edit but not license, sell, or copy the footage for any purpose without the permission 
of Casa Duse.” Id. at 252.  After negotiations for a final employment agreement fell through, 
Merkin sent Krakovski an email claiming total ownership of the raw footage and forbidding 
Krakovski from using it in any capacity. Id.  Merkin also threatened to call all film festivals to 
which Heads Up was being sent and telling them that he did not consent to its screening. Id.  
Merkin even went so far as to register for a copyright on the film with the Copyright Office, 
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claiming himself as the sole owner. Id.  In March 2012, Krakovski submitted Heads Up to film 
festivals and organized a screening for the New York Film Academy (NYFA); Merkin sent a 
cease-and-desist notice to the NYFA in response. Id. at 253.  Casa Duse missed out on 
submission deadlines for four festivals as a result of the dispute, in addition to losing all the 
money it had invested in the NYFA screening. Id. 
 Much like in Garcia v. Google, the district court in Casa Duse found that Merkin could 
not copyright his creative contributions to the film and did not possess any copyright interest 
in the final product. Id. at 255.  On appeal, the parties agreed that Merkin was not a “joint 
author” of Heads Up, nor were his contributions of the “work-for-hire” nature. Id.  The main 
dispute thus arose over whether Merkin could copyright his individual contributions to the 
films. Id.  Echoing the discussion found the in Garcia 1 dissent and the Garcia 2  majority, the 
Second Circuit explained that the Copyright Act lists works such as motion pictures and 
music recordings as eligible for copyright protection, however, 
The [Copyright] Act lists none of the constituent parts of any of these kinds of 
works as "works of authorship." This uniform absence of explicit protection 
suggests that non-freestanding contributions to works of authorship are not 
ordinarily themselves works of authorship. 
 
Id. at 257.  Further, the Act’s language mandating that individual contributions to works such 
as films be "separate and independent" in order to be copyrightable on their own “indicates 
that inseparable contributions integrated into a single work cannot separately obtain such 
protection.” Id. 
 After mentioning the tumultuous procedural history of Garcia, the Second Circuit 
immediately agreed with the Garcia 2 majority in holding that, 
Filmmaking is a collaborative process typically involving artistic contributions 
from large numbers of people, including—in addition to producers, directors, 
and screenwriters—actors, designers, cinematographers, camera operators, 
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and a host of skilled technical contributors. If copyright subsisted separately 
in each of their contributions to the completed film, the copyright in the film 
itself, which is recognized by statute as a work of authorship, could be 
undermined by any number of individual claims. 
 
Id. at 258.  Of course, the Second Circuit also cautioned that a director can hold a copyright 
interest in a film, provided he or she a sole or joint author of the film itself. Id.  In addition, 
the opinion mentions that authors of “freestanding works” that are then included in a film, 
such as a “dance performance or a song,” can retain copyright interest in those contributions. 
Id. at 259.  Finally, as in Garcia 2, the Second Circuit majority mentioned the policy argument 
that “a conclusion other than [this one] would grant contributors like Merkin greater rights 
than joint authors, who . . . have no right to interfere with a co-author's use of the copyrighted 
work.” Id. 
 The Casa Duse opinion served to bolster the contention that the Garcia 1 decision was 
wrongly decided and went against public policy concerning both copyright law and the 
freedom of speech itself.  The relative swiftness of the Casa Duse opinion, practically on the 
heels of the Garcia 2 opinion, also illustrates that the Garcia 2 opinion was one that other 
Circuits had been paying close attention to.  It appeared as though, in the wake of Garcia 2, 
that copyright on the internet had received a major and lasting victory. The legal 
community’s relief after the Garcia 2 decision may have been premature, however, as the 
another Ninth Circuit case is setting up to have important ramifications in the realm of 
copyright. 
 In 2007, a mother in Pennsylvania uploaded to YouTube a video of her baby dancing 
to the song “Let’s Go Crazy” by Prince.13  Prince’s publishers objected to the video being 
                                                        
13 Ben Sisario, YouTube ‘Dancing Baby’ Copyright Ruling Sets Fair Use Guideline, The New 
York Times (September 14, 2015). 
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hosted online and, in an act of defiance, the mother filed a lawsuit; the case has languished 
in limbo for eight years since. Id.  In a decision that cleared the way for the case to finally go 
to trial, the Ninth Circuit held “that copyright holders must consider fair use before asking 
services like YouTube to remove videos that include material they control.” Id.  This ruling 
has enormous implications for copyright on the internet, specifically on YouTube 
considering the site’s ContentID system, but also for any site that can be affected by a DMCA 
takedown notice. Id.  As with Garcia, the case appears to be dividing supporters one more, 
with, 
The Motion Picture Association of America and the R.I.A.A. both [supporting] 
Universal, which argued that fair use should be considered an “affirmative 
defense” only when part of an infringement suit. On the other side of the issue, 
Google, Twitter and Tumblr rallied behind Ms. Lenz [and her fair use/burden-
shifting argument.] 
 
Id.  By placing such an emphasis on justifying DMCA takedowns against content that may 
constitute fair use, the Ninth Circuit has dealt a serious blow to the DMCA’s structure; only 
the outcome of the so-called “Dancing Baby Case” will hold the answer to how serious the 
blow actually is. 
V.  Conclusion 
 The original Garcia v. Google opinion, and its subsequent rehearing, generated a good 
deal of controversy while also highlighting the just how overlooked the interplay between 
copyright law and freedom of speech truly is.  Since the rise of video hosting websites such 
as YouTube, the protections afforded to copyright holders under the DMCA have been used 
more often as a sword than as a shield. The original holding in the Garcia case would have 
                                                        
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/business/media/youtube-dancing-baby-
copyright-ruling-sets-fair-use-guideline.html?_r=1. 
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only sharpened that blade by providing many more people than Congress ever intended with 
the ability to issue takedown notices to videos for which they contributed even the most 
minimal of creative content.  Even though the Garcia rehearing corrected the original 
opinion’s grave mistake, the fight for an acceptable balance between copyright law and free 
speech on the Internet has continued and will continue for years to come.  Thankfully, it 
appears as though the courts with the most to say in these matters have started to see things 
in a way that provides hope for the conflict going forward. 
